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Functional diversity of brain 
networks supports consciousness 
and verbal intelligence
Lorina Naci1, Amelie Haugg2, Alex MacDonald3, Mimma Anello4, Evan Houldin5, 
Shakib Naqshbandi6, Laura E. Gonzalez-Lara5, Miguel Arango6, Christopher Harle6, 
Rhodri Cusack1 & Adrian M. Owen5
How are the myriad stimuli arriving at our senses transformed into conscious thought? To address this 
question, in a series of studies, we asked whether a common mechanism underlies loss of information 
processing in unconscious states across different conditions, which could shed light on the brain 
mechanisms of conscious cognition. With a novel approach, we brought together for the first time, data 
from the same paradigm—a highly engaging auditory-only narrative—in three independent domains: 
anesthesia-induced unconsciousness, unconsciousness after brain injury, and individual differences in 
intellectual abilities during conscious cognition. During external stimulation in the unconscious state, 
the functional differentiation between the auditory and fronto-parietal systems decreased significantly 
relatively to the conscious state. Conversely, we found that stronger functional differentiation 
between these systems in response to external stimulation predicted higher intellectual abilities during 
conscious cognition, in particular higher verbal acuity scores in independent cognitive testing battery. 
These convergent findings suggest that the responsivity of sensory and higher-order brain systems to 
external stimulation, especially through the diversification of their functional responses is an essential 
feature of conscious cognition and verbal intelligence.
Understanding the brain mechanisms of conscious cognition is one of the great frontiers of cognitive neuro-
science. A much-researched yet unresolved question is how the myriad sensory inputs arriving at our senses 
become integrated into meaningful representations that inform cognitive performance and give rise to individual 
differences in intellectual abilities. In the conscious brain, cognition is thought to arise from iterative interactions 
among brain regions of graded functional specialization. These include sensory-driven, e.g., auditory and visual, 
regions on one end of the functional hierarchy, and supramodal regions in frontal and parietal lobes that carry out 
higher-order cognition, such as executive function, on the other1–3. However, to fully understand how the inter-
actions of these widespread brain systems give rise to conscious information processing, it is necessary to factor 
out brain processes that are not intrinsic to consciousness4. To this end, functional neuroimaging of individuals 
rendered unconscious under deep anesthesia or after severe brain injury provides a unique window for demarcat-
ing unconscious processes, and conversely, shedding light on brain mechanisms that are essential for conscious 
information processing and cognition in the healthy brain.
In a series of studies, we asked whether a common mechanism underlies loss of information processing in 
unconscious states across different conditions, which could shed light on the brain mechanisms of conscious 
cognition. To address this question we brought together, for the first time, data from the same paradigm—a 
highly engaging auditory-only narrative—in three independent domains: anesthesia-induced unconsciousness, 
unconsciousness after brain injury, and individual differences in intellectual abilities during conscious cognition.
Despite a growing number of anesthesia studies, it remains unknown how loss of consciousness affects syn-
thesis of information across sensory and higher-order brain systems. To date, the majority of functional Magnetic 
Resonance Imaging (fMRI) studies of anesthesia have investigated the brain during a task- and stimulus-free 
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condition, known as the “resting” state, because behavioral responses and eye opening are impaired by sedation 
prior to loss of consciousness5, which render traditional experimental paradigms that probe complex informa-
tion processing impossible to implement. However, because resting state studies do not use sensory stimulation, 
they cannot shed light on how the synthesis of external information breaks down from loss of consciousness. 
Several studies have used simple psychophysical stimuli and, therefore, have limited their investigation to 
well-circumscribed responses in sensory-specific cortex6. In the auditory domain, studies have used simple audi-
tory stimuli to investigate the limits of auditory processing during anesthetic-induced sedation. Following light 
anesthesia with sevoflurane, activation to auditory word stimuli relative to silence was preserved in bilateral 
superior temporal gyri, right thalamus, bilateral parietal, left frontal, and right occipital cortices7. Parallel results 
have been found with both propofol and the short-acting barbiturate thiopental, suggesting that basic auditory 
processing remains intact during reduced or absent conscious awareness6,8–10.
By contrast, light anesthesia impairs more complex auditory processing11,12. For example, one study13 showed 
that the characteristic bilateral temporal-lobe responses to auditorily presented sentences were preserved during 
propofol- induced sedation, whereas ‘comprehension-related’ activity in inferior frontal and posterior temporal 
regions to ambiguous versus non-ambiguous sentences was abolished. However, this study did not achieve the 
unconscious state due to low anesthetic doses. Thus, to date, no anesthetic study has directly investigated how 
the loss of consciousness affects the processing of a complex, real-world narratives across sensory-driven and 
higher-order brain systems.
Another group of individuals—patients who lose consciousness after severe brain injury—stand to shed light 
on the brain mechanism affected by loss of consciousness. Following serious brain injury, a proportion of patients 
manifest disorders of consciousness (DoC) and exhibit very limited responsivity to commands administered 
at the bedside by the clinical staff. If entirely behaviorally non-responsive, they are thought to lack conscious-
ness—be in a vegetative state (VS)14— or, if they have reproducible but inconsistent willful responses, to be in 
a minimal conscious state (MCS)15. The clinical, behavioral assessment of behaviorally non-responsive patients 
is particularly difficult and can result in high misdiagnosis rate (41%)16. Studies show that, despite the apparent 
absence of external signs of consciousness, a significant minority of patients (~19%)17–19, thought to be in a VS, 
can demonstrate conscious awareness by willful modulation of their brain activity20–26, a phenomenon captured 
by the recently proposed term ‘cognitive motor dissociation’ (CMD)27. In the present study, to circumvent the 
limitations of behavioral testing and ensure that patients categorized as unconscious showed no willful brain 
responses, each patient underwent an fMRI-based assessment with a previously established command-following 
protocol for detecting covert awareness22,28. Similarly to the deep anesthesia context, experimental paradigms 
that probe the processing of complex external information have, until recently, not been implemented in DoC 
patients29–32. Although, the disrupted brain mechanism in patients who are genuinely unconscious has been stud-
ied in the resting state paradigm33–39, this, by default, cannot help to elucidate fully the mechanisms underlying 
loss of information processing in severely brain-injured unconscious patients.
The inherent limitations in testing unconscious individuals and the absence of identical sensory stimulation 
paradigms in anesthesia and severe brain injury investigations has hindered understanding of common mecha-
nisms underlying loss of information processing across these conditions. To address this knowledge gap, in two 
different studies, we used the same paradigm and a novel approach30 for measuring complex information pro-
cessing in unconsciousness from deep anesthesia and severe brain injury, as participants freely listened to richly 
evocative stimulation in the form of a plot-driven narrative—a brief (5 minute) auditory-only excerpt from the 
kidnapping scene in the movie ‘Taken’. This approach circumvents traditional limitations by requiring neither 
behavioral response nor eye opening, and, importantly, elicits both sensory and fronto-parietal brain responses 
that are known to support high-order cognition, such as executive function40–47. By their very nature, engaging 
narratives are designed to give listeners a common conscious experience driven, in part, by the recruitment of 
similar executive processes, as each listener continuously integrates their observations, analyses and predictions, 
while filtering out any distractions, leading to an ongoing involvement in the story’s plot. We have previously 
shown30–32 that when different individuals freely listen to the same narrative, stereotyped changes of brain activity 
across these frontal and parietal cortical regions are observed, which reflect a robust and similar recruitment of 
executive function across different individuals. Thus, this paradigm is particularly suited for investigating the 
extent of information processing in behaviorally non-responsive individuals in unconscious states.
Conversely, we asked whether the principles of information processing revealed by the anesthesia and severe 
brain-injury studies could predict conscious cognitive performance, an independent domain that relies on con-
tinuously efficient processing of external information. Understanding individual differences in intellectual abil-
ities is profoundly important as it may, in the future, help facilitate their enhancement, yet the underlying brain 
mechanisms remain poorly understood. Previous studies have suggested that functional connectivity within the 
fronto-parietal network during executive or cognitive tasks is related to individual differences in intelligence40. 
This approach has been useful in identifying functionally segregated neural correlates of intelligence, i.e., the 
fronto-parietal network, but it does not reflect the role of sensory-driven networks or of their interactions with 
higher-order systems.
In the first study, we asked how information processing across the auditory and fronto-parietal systems during 
the story was affected by loss of consciousness in deep anesthesia in healthy participants (N = 16). In the second 
study, we tested whether the insights gleaned from the anesthesia study could generalize to loss of consciousness 
after severe brain injury, in a group of patients (N = 11) with disorders of consciousness that underwent fMRI 
scanning during the same audio story as healthy participants from study one. In the third study, we investigated 
how the cognitive performance of the individuals from the anesthesia study (N = 14) independently-measured 
with a cognitive battery weeks after the sedation study related to their synthesis of complex sensory information 
between auditory and fronto-parietal systems during the audio-story task.
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
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Results
Information processing under deep anesthesia. To measure information processing during the story, 
we adopted a previously established method using the same audio story30, where we showed that the extent of 
stimulus-driven cross-subject correlation provided a measure of regional stimulus-driven information processing 
(Fig. 1A–C). In the wakeful condition of the anesthesia study, we observed widespread and significant (p < 0.05; 
FWE cor) cross-subject correlation between healthy participants within sensory-driven (primary and associa-
tion) auditory cortex, as well as higher-order frontal and parietal regions (Fig. 1D), consistent with Naci et al.30. 
By contrast, in deep anesthesia, the significant (p < 0.05; FWE cor) cross-subject correlation was limited to the 
auditory cortex, with the exception of two small clusters in left prefrontal and right parietal cortex (Fig. 1E), sug-
gesting that the processing of sensory information was preserved in the sensory, but almost entirely abolished in 
fronto-parietal regions.
Subsequently, we investigated the impaired brain mechanism underlying loss of information processing in 
these higher-order regions. Current theories of consciousness48–50, such as the Integrated Information Theory 
(IIT), propose that conscious cognition relies on the brain’s capacity to efficiently integrate information across 
different specialized systems48, suggesting that both interconnectedness and functional differentiation of brain 
systems are important for information processing. However, different putative mechanisms are consistent with 
our results, including reduced/abolished connectivity among distinct brain systems49 and loss of functional dif-
ferentiation48 (i.e., homogeneous connectivity across them). To directly investigate the underlying mechanism, 
we distinguished four possible impairment patterns consonant with theories of consciousness that could explain 
impaired information processing in deep anesthesia: 1) a loss of long-range connectivity between auditory and 
fronto-parietal networks (Fig. 2A); (2) a loss of connectivity between areas within each network, e.g., between 
frontal and parietal regions (Fig. 2B); (3) a combination of 1 and 2 (Fig. 2C); and (4) a loss of differentiation 
between auditory and fronto-parietal networks (Fig. 2D).
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Figure 1. Brain-wide inter-subject correlation of neural activity during the audio story. (A) The audio story 
elicited significant (p < 0.05; FWE cor) inter-subject correlation across the brain, including frontal and parietal 
cortex, thought to support executive function. (B) The baseline elicited significant (p < 0.05; FWE cor) inter-
subject correlation within primary and association auditory cortex. A small cluster was also observed in right 
inferior prefrontal cortex. None was observed in dorsal prefrontal and parietal cortex. (C) The audio story 
elicited significantly (p < 0.05; FWE cor) more inter-subject correlation than the auditory baseline derived from 
the same stimulus, in parietal, temporal, motor, and dorsal/ventral frontal/prefrontal cortex. A, B, C, adapted 
with permission from Naci et al.30. (D) The audio story elicited significant (p < 0.05; FWE cor) inter-subject 
correlation across the brain, including frontal and parietal cortex, in the wakeful state of the anesthesia study. 
(E) In the deep anesthesia state, significant (p < 0.05; FWE cor) inter-subject correlation was limited to the 
auditory cortex with the exception of two small clusters, one in left prefrontal and the other in right parietal 
cortex. (F) The audio story elicited significantly (p < 0.05; FWE cor) more cross-subject correlation in the awake 
than deeply sedated condition bilaterally in temporal, ventral prefrontal and frontal cortex, and further in 
parietal, motor, and dorsal frontal and prefrontal cortex in the right hemisphere. Warmer colors depict higher 
t-values of cross-subject correlation. Warmer colors depict higher t-values of inter-subject correlation.
Figure 2. Candidate patterns of connectivity perturbations caused by deep propofol anesthesia. (A) Loss of 
long-range connectivity between different networks; (B) Loss of long-range connectivity within a specific 
network, e.g., between frontal and parietal regions; (C) A combination of patterns in A and B; (D) Loss of 
functional differentiation between different brain networks.
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
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The global effect of anesthesia on brain networks’ connectivity. Initially, we investigated how deep 
propofol anesthesia perturbed the patterns of global connectivity. During the audio story, a two-way ANOVA with 
factors connectivity type (within, between) and state (wakeful, deep anesthesia) showed that connectivity across 
networks increased significantly (main effect of state: F(16) = 8.57; p = 0.01) (Fig. 3A,B) in deep anesthesia rela-
tive to wakefulness. Connectivity between increased more than within networks (interaction effect, state x connec-
tivity type: F(15) = 5.58; p = 0.03) (Fig. 3E), driven by a significant increase in the between network connectivity 
(t(15) = 3.82, p = 0.002) and no overall change in the within connectivity (see SI for complete results; Figures S3, 
S4). By contrast, during the resting state, deep anesthesia showed the opposite effect on between and within network 
connectivity, with a larger impact on the within relative to between network connectivity (interaction effect, state x 
connectivity type: F(15) = 5.4; p = 0.03) (Fig. 3C,D). Connectivity within was significantly reduced, but no changes 
were observed in deep anesthesia in the between network connectivity (see SI for complete results).
A direct comparison between the audio story and resting state confirmed that anesthesia affected connectivity 
in the two conditions in opposite directions. A two-way ANOVA with factors condition (audio story, resting 
state) and state (wakeful, deep anesthesia) showed a condition x state interaction [F(15) = 7.01; p = 0.02] that was 
driven by an overall connectivity reduction during the resting state and connectivity increase during the audio 
story in deep anesthesia. The effects were the same when functional differentiation was measured as the ratio of 
between- to within-network connectivity.
These suggest that, when the brain is at rest, reduced connectivity within brain networks rather than loss 
of functional differentiation between them, characterizes the unconscious state. By contrast, when the brain is 
exposed to complex naturalistic stimuli from the environment, reduced functional differentiation between brain 
networks leads to loss of information processing in the unconscious state. However, these results must be inter-
preted with caution, in light of the consistent block order in deep sedation.
The effect of anesthesia on auditory and fronto-parietal networks’ connectivity. Next, we asked 
specifically whether reduced functional differentiation between the auditory and fronto-parietal networks drove 
the loss of information processing in the fronto-parietal regions during the story. Consistent with effects at the 
whole-brain level, we found a significant increase in the AUD–DAN and AUD–ECN connectivity [t(15) = 2.6, 
p = 0.02; t(15) = 4.98, p = 0.0002, respectively] (Fig. 4A–D), or a significant reduction of the functional differentia-
tion between the AUD and DAN, ECN in deep anesthesia relative to wakefulness. By contrast, in the resting state, 
connectivity between these networks was not affected by sedation (Fig. 3). These results suggested that reduced 
functional differentiation between the auditory and fronto-parietal networks leads to loss of external information 
processing in the unconscious state. Conversely, they suggested that the functional differentiation between the audi-
tory and fronto-parietal networks underlies conscious processing of complex auditory information.
To test specifically whether functional differentiation in the conscious state would be driven by the complex 
features of the audio story, including its narrative, rather than merely the presence of external stimulation, we 
compared the AUD–DAN and AUD–ECN pairwise connectivity in wakeful individuals during the audio story 
with those in the two baseline conditions, a scrambled version of the story that retained the sensory features but 
was devoid of the narrative, and the resting state. During the scrambled story, functional connectivity between 
the AUD and DAN, but not ECN, was significantly lower than in the resting state [AUD–DAN: t(14) = −3.4, 
p = 0.005]. Furthermore, during the intact story, functional connectivity between the AUD and DAN, ECN 
was significantly lower than in the scrambled story [AUD–DAN: t(14) = −11.2, p = 0.00000002; AUD–ECN: 
t(14) = −10.62, p < 0.00000004], and than in the resting state [AUD–DAN: t(14) = −7.3, p < 0.000004; AUD–
ECN: t(14) = −2.7, p < 0.015] (Fig. 5A–H). These results suggested that the AUD–DAN connectivity was modu-
lated by the presence of low-level sensory stimulation over the resting state baseline, and further by the presence 
of the high-order features of story, including its narrative, over the scrambled baseline.
The effect of severe brain injury on the auditory and fronto-parietal networks’ connectivity. 
Results from both conscious and unconscious conditions in the previous study suggested that functional differen-
tiation between the auditory and fronto-parietal networks underlined conscious processing of complex auditory 
information. In the next study, we further tested this claim in severe brain-injury, which served as an independent 
manipulation of consciousness.
The structural profiles and full behavioral description of the convenience sample of brain-injured patients 
(N = 11) are shown in Figure S1 and Tables S2, S3. Patients who showed willful brain responses in the independ-
ent command-following assessment22,28 were considered covertly aware and labeled DoC+ (N = 6), and those 
who showed no signs of conscious awareness were labeled as DoC− (N = 5) (Fig. 6), for subsequent analyses. 
Similarly to conscious individuals (Fig. 5), we expected DoC+ patient group to show a heightened differentia-
tion/down-regulation of the AUD and DAN, ECN pairwise connectivity during the audio story relative to resting 
state baseline connectivity. By contrast, we did not expect a down-regulation of the connectivity between these 
networks during the audio story in DoC- patient group.
The DoC+ group showed a significant down-regulation of the auditory and fronto-parietal networks connec-
tivity in the audio story relative to the resting state [AUD–DAN: t(5) = −1.9, p = 0.05; AUD–ECN: t(5) = −3.4, 
p = 0.02] (Fig. 7A–H, E–L), and was significantly different from the DoC- (N = 5) group, who did not show this 
effect (Fig. 7C–J, E–L) [AUD–DAN: t(9) = −3.6, p = 0.005; AUD–ECN: t(9) = −3.4, p = 0.008]. The predicted 
effect pattern was also observed for individual patients, with 5/6 DoC+ patients showing a down-regulation of 
the connectivity between AUD and DAN, ECN (Fig. 7F,L). The effect in the DoC+ group was consistent with 
the effect observed in healthy conscious individuals (Fig. 5). By contrast, the DoC– group showed significantly 
enhanced AUD–DAN connectivity during the audio story relative to resting state [t(4) = 4.52; p = 0.01] (Fig. 7E). 
This was consistent with the up-regulation of the AUD–DAN connectivity observed in the anesthesia-induced 
unconscious state in the previous study.
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
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Network connectivity and individual differences in conscious cognition. Taken together, the 
results from the two previous two studies suggested that heightened differentiation between the auditory and 
fronto-parietal networks supports conscious processing of complex auditory information, and more broadly, 
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Figure 3. Global within- and between-network functional connectivity perturbations by deep propofol 
anesthesia (A–D) Functional connectivity matrices for five brain networks in the story and resting state 
conditions, in the wakeful and deep anesthesia states. Each cell represents the correlation of the time-course 
of one region of interest (ROI) with another, or itself (in the center diagonal). Cells representing correlations 
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conscious cognition. In the third study, we further tested this claim directly, by asking whether it predicted 
individual differences in cognitive performance. We assessed the cognitive performance of a participant subset 
(14/16) from the anesthesia study, who came back to the laboratory weeks later, with a battery comprising 12 
cognitive tests51 that measured short-term memory, reasoning, and verbal acuity (SI, Table S4). Based on converg-
ing results from studies 1 and 2, we expected stronger differentiation between the auditory and fronto-parietal 
networks during the audio story to predict stronger cognitive performance, or, a negative relationship between 
the AUD and DAN, ECN connectivity and the independently measured cognitive performance in the same 
individuals.
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within the AUD and ECN networks in the intact story (E), scrambled story (F), and resting state (G) baseline. 
(H) Average AUD–ECN connectivity (z values) for each condition. A1: Primary auditory cortex; LFEF: Left 
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anterior IPS; RAIPS: Right anterior IPS LMT: Left middle temporal area; RMT: Right middle temporal area; 
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Figure 6. Summary of DoC patients’ clinical and fMRI assessment data. Auditory processing. In the fMRI 
assessment, three patients clinically diagnosed to be in a VS did not show evidence of auditory processing. 
The other eight patients who showed evidence of auditory processing, two patients clinically diagnosed as VS 
did not show evidence of brain-based command-following, and the other six, including two diagnosed as VS, 
showed evidence of brain-based command-following, and thus, of covert awareness. Command-following. 6/11 
patients followed task commands by willfully modulating their brain activity as requested, and thus, provided 
evidence of conscious awareness. Two of these (P2, P5) presented a CMD profile, or a behavioral diagnosis of 
VS that was inconsistent with their positive fMRI results. 5/11 patients showed no evidence of willful responses 
in the fMRI command-following task, and, thus, provided no neuroimaging evidence of awareness. One (P7) 
showed no neuroimaging evidence of awareness despite an MCS diagnosis, due to falling asleep in the scanner 
for the entirely of the session (Materials and Methods).
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The individuals’ AUD–DAN connectivity during the audio story was significantly negatively correlated 
(r = −0.66; p < 0.007) with their cognitive performance in the verbal acuity (Fig. 8A,B) component of the battery, 
which accounted for the variance of tasks that used verbal stimuli (i.e., digit span, verbal reasoning, color-word 
remapping; Supporting Information). The AUD–DAN connectivity did not predict performance in the other 
two components, and the AUD–ECN connectivity did not predict performance in any of the three (Fig. 8A,C). 
Pairwise connectivity between these networks in the resting state did not predict cognitive performance in any of 
Figure 7. Modulation of auditory to fronto-parietal connectivity by meaningful stimulation in DoC patients. 
Similarly to healthy individuals, connectivity between the auditory and fronto-parietal networks in DoC+ 
patients was significantly modulated by the presence of complex meaningful stimuli, with the functional 
differentiation between the AUD and DAN/ECN increasing significantly in the audio story as compared to the 
resting state baseline condition. (A–D) Connectivity between the ROIs within the AUD and DAN networks, 
during the audio story and resting state baseline, in the DoC+ (A,B) and DoC− (C,D) patients. (E) Differential 
averaged AUD–DAN connectivity (z values) for each patient group. (F) Differential averaged AUD–DAN 
connectivity (z values) for each individual patient. (G–J) Connectivity between the ROIs within the AUD and 
ECN networks, during the audio story and resting state baseline, in the DoC+ (G,H) and DoC− (I,J) patients. 
(K) Differential averaged AUD–ECN connectivity (z values) for each patient group. (L) Differential averaged 
AUD–ECN connectivity (z values) for each individual patient. A1: Primary auditory cortex; LFEF: Left frontal 
eye field; RFEF: Right frontal eye field; LPIPS: Left posterior IPS; RPIPS: Right posterior IPS; LAIPS Left 
anterior IPS; RAIPS: Right anterior IPS LMT: Left middle temporal area; RMT: Right middle temporal area; 
DMPFC: Dorsal medial PFC; LAPFC: Left anterior prefrontal cortex; RAPFC: Right anterior prefrontal cortex 
LSP: Left superior parietal; RSP: Right superior parietal.
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Figure 8. The relationship between brain network connectivity during the audio story and independently-
measured cognitive performance. The functional connectivity between AUD and DAN, but not ECN (or DMN, 
used here as a high-level control network) during the story, and not the resting state baseline condition, was 
significantly inversely related to verbal performance. (A) Group-averaged correlation between the functional 
connectivity (FC) of the AUD and the DMN/DAN/ECN networks during the audio story and resting state 
conditions and verbal performance. (B,C) For each participant, the correlation between their AUD–DAN (B)/
AUD–ECN (C) connectivity during the story and their verbal performance is displayed.
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the domains (Fig. 8A). Further, we found no relationship between the connectivity of the AUD and default mode 
network (DMN), included as a control high-order network, and cognitive performance.
In summary, the results of the third study converged with the other two, and suggested that the extent to which 
the functional responses of the auditory and fronto-parietal networks to complex auditory stimuli dissociated 
from one another predicted independent cognitive performance in the verbal domain, and thus, may be a deter-
mining factor in individual differences in verbal acuity.
Discussion
In a series of studies, we asked whether a common mechanism underlies loss of information processing in uncon-
scious states across different conditions, which could shed light on the brain mechanisms of conscious cognition. 
To this end, for the first time, we brought together two very disparate conditions where consciousness is lost—
deep anesthesia and severe brain injury—to investigate the modulation of functional connectivity between the 
auditory and fronto-parietal networks by identical complex stimulation in identical paradigms. Subsequently, 
we tested whether findings from these studies predicted individual differences in intellectual abilities during 
conscious information processing.
Common mechanism for loss of information processing in unconsciousness during anesthesia 
and after severe brain injury. We use a novel approach30–32, to measure external information processing 
in response to richly evocative stimulation portraying real-world events, during deep anesthesia and severe brain 
injury. In the anesthesia study, we found that the processing of the story information was preserved in auditory 
cortex, but almost entirely abolished in fronto-parietal regions. Deep anesthesia led to a significant reduction 
in the functional differentiation of several networks across the brain, and specifically, between the auditory and 
fronto-parietal networks, during the story condition. These results suggested that anesthesia impaired the pro-
cessing of complex external information in fronto-parietal regions by eroding their functional differentiation 
from sensory (e.g., auditory) systems, and not by impairing connections between or within them. Propofol was 
used here as a common anesthetic agent, and future studies that employ the same paradigm across different 
agents will help elucidate whether specific agents vary in their effect on connectivity during complex stimulation. 
Our results are consistent with previous findings from resting state studies, suggesting that anesthesia reduces 
the repertoire of discriminable brain states52,53, and that during loss of consciousness global synchrony impairs 
information processing by leading to a breakdown of causal interactions between brain areas54–56. Further, they 
are consistent with resting state studies using sleep-induced altered states of consciousness, which show that 
hyper-synchrony perturbs the feed-forward propagation of auditory information57, as well as feedback projec-
tions58, and more broadly, the stable patterns of causal interactions in response to external stimulation across the 
brain59. While these previous resting state studies suggest that global synchrony breaks down causal interactions, 
the investigation of causal cortico-cortical interactions was outside the scope of this work. We did not find an 
effect of deep sedation on thalamo-cortical connectivity in any of the five brain networks (SI), and while outside 
of our scope here, a potential causal role of thalamic inputs to cortico-cortical connectivity in deep sedation 
remains to be investigated further.
Our findings from the resting state condition in deep anesthesia manipulation agree with a previously 
reported reduction of brain connectivity in deep propofol anesthesia during the resting state49,54,60, in particu-
lar with a reduction of connectivity within the default-mode60–62; but, see53,63), and the executive control net-
works60,64. Although consistency with previous studies suggests otherwise, we note that differences between the 
story and resting state conditions in deep sedation must be interpreted with caution, in light of the consistent 
block order. Nevertheless, the results from the sensory stimulation condition reveal a different mechanism under-
lying the loss of external information processing than suggested by resting state studies. First, in the audio-story 
condition, the connectivity within networks was affected by sedation in the opposite direction to the resting state. 
Second, in the resting state condition, we observed no effect of deep anesthesia on connectivity between distinct 
networks, which, by contrast, increased significantly during the auditory stimulation condition suggesting loss of 
functional differentiation across the cortex. Another type of stimulation— transcranial magnetic stimulation—
has previously been used to directly perturb the cortex in unconscious states and demonstrate that responses 
across the cortex become undifferentiated from one another55,65. In summary, these results suggest that deep 
anesthesia affects the brain differently when it is exposed to complex external stimulation relative to rest, with the 
stimulus-evoked feed-forward processing cascade being echoed undifferentiated throughout the brain, thus over-
coming the inhibitory effect of propofol on neural connectivity that has been reported in resting state studies66.
Similarly to deeply anesthetized unconscious individuals, severely brain-injured patients who were not 
consciously aware during the study showed significantly reduced differentiation between the auditory and 
fronto-parietal networks during the story relative to their resting baseline. Conversely, similarly to healthy wake-
ful individuals, severely brain-injured patients who were covertly aware showed the opposite effect: significantly 
enhanced differentiation between the auditory and fronto-parietal networks during the story relative to their rest-
ing baseline. The modulation of the sensory to higher-order networks’ relationship by environmental stimuli in 
severely brain-damaged (albeit conscious) patients suggests this is a fundamental feature of the conscious brain, 
which is resilient to substantial metabolic dysfunction following brain injury67. We caution that our results do 
not suggest that each DoC+ patient understood or processed the story similarly as healthy individuals. Foremost, 
DoC patients who retain covert awareness vary widely in their arousal level throughout the day. Further, although 
the individual DoC+ patients discussed here retained the functional brain architecture to support covert con-
scious awareness, the absence of a sensory baseline and lack of individual-level statistics, render it impossible to 
ascertain the extent of conscious processing of the story or its understanding in individual patients.
Previous studies that have compared anesthetized and unconscious brain-injured patients have highlighted 
that, similarly to the effect of common anesthetic agents including propofol60,68, brain dysfunction in this 
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population is prevalent within the fronto-parietal network69,70. They have indicated preserved sensory processing 
(e.g., responses to noxious stimulation, auditory or speech perception) in the absence of higher-order compo-
nents (e.g., neural evidence of pain perception, language comprehension)5, and suggested that disconnection 
between sensory and fronto-parietal systems is common to both populations. By contrast, our findings suggest 
that, when the brain is exposed to complex external information, these systems do not disconnect from one 
another in these unconscious states, as previously suggested by aforementioned resting state studies. Rather, our 
findings demonstrate that the erosion of functional differentiation among these systems underlies impaired infor-
mation processing when consciousness is lost. Conversely, the significant increase of functional differentiation 
between these systems by low-level sensory stimulation relative to the resting state baseline in different conscious 
populations (i.e., healthy and brain-injured individuals) suggests that functional responsivity to external stimula-
tion is a robust feature of the conscious brain.
Although loss of consciousness is common to both deeply anesthetized and some severe brain-injured 
patients, these two populations differ greatly. In the former no structural changes occur, and the functional brain 
response is altered pharmacologically. In the latter, an array of structural damage, greatly varying across patients, 
is present and affects altered brain responses, leading to complete functional loss in some domains and potential 
functional re-organization and preservation in others. Given the large differences between these two, the simi-
larity of the functional response to previously validated targeted stimulation30 across these populations provides 
strong evidence for a common mechanism underlying loss of information processing in the unconscious state. 
These results are consistent with current theories of consciousness, which suggest that it requires both differen-
tiation and integration of information in neural circuits48,54,71, and elucidate the underlying brain mechanism by 
showing the critical role of functional differentiation between sensory and higher-order systems when informa-
tion processing is required.
Mechanism for conscious information processing and cognition. The third study further confirmed 
the role of the functional differentiation between the sensory and higher-order systems in conscious cognition. 
Individuals who showed higher differentiation between the auditory and dorsal attention network (DAN) in 
response to the audio story had higher verbal acuity scores than individuals who showed lower differentiation. 
The story elicited a range of cognitive processes such as the orientation and modulation of attention to the sali-
ency of incoming auditory inputs— a function subserved primarily by the DAN72 — and language perception 
and comprehension, which corresponded to those engaged by the verbal acuity tasks of the cognitive battery. The 
functional relationship between the auditory and executive control network (ECN) was not predictive of cogni-
tive performance, which is likely accounted for by the nature of the stimulus and fMRI paradigm which did not 
require behavioral response planning or monitoring— a function sub-served primarily by the ECN73. There was 
no relationship between the auditory and fronto-parietal connectivity in response to the story and performance 
in the short-term memory or reasoning components of the cognitive battery, likely due to the story’s cognitive 
demands low loading on these components. We note that the verbal component of the cognitive battery, which 
comprised 12 tasks, accounted for the majority of variance in a subset of different tasks that used verbal stimuli 
(digit span, verbal reasoning, color-word remapping; full description in SI). Thus, in capturing a cross-section 
of processes employed in these different tasks, the verbal component represented a robust example of varied 
domain-specific processes, which are abstracted away from the demands of particular tasks. Therefore, although 
these results suggested that the relationship between brain connectivity and intelligence is domain-specific, future 
studies are required to further test the sensory–higher-order networks’ relationship and other cognitive domains/
processes.
Further, these results agree with a previous proposal that the relationship between brain connectivity and 
intelligence is context specific74. In contrast to the a-priory predicted relationship between these networks’ con-
nectivity and intelligence during complex sensory stimulation, we found no relationship between them in the 
resting state. Notably, these results were predicted from two different populations where loss of from information 
in unconsciousness suggested a common mechanism for information processing during conscious cognition. 
Consistent with a recent emerging view in the field75, they suggested that individual differences in intellectual 
abilities rely on the dynamic reconfigurations of connectivity in response to incoming sensory information76, 
within a widespread system comprising sensory-specific and extra-modal cortices in fronto-parietal cortex.
In summary, findings herein suggest that the dissolution of functional differentiation
is a common basis for loss of information processing across widely different conditions where consciousness 
is lost. Conversely, they suggest that the responsivity of sensory and higher-order brain systems to external stim-
ulation, especially through the diversification of their functional responses is an essential feature of conscious 
cognition and domain-specific intelligence.
Material and Methods
Participants. Ethical approval was obtained from the Health Sciences Research Ethics Board and Psychology 
Research Ethics Board of Western University. All experiments were performed in accordance with the relevant 
guidelines and regulations set out by the research ethics boards. All healthy volunteers were right-handed, native 
English speakers, and had no history of neurological disorders. The respective substitute decision makers gave 
informed written consent for each patient’s participation. They signed informed consent before participating and 
were remunerated for their time. 19 (18–40 years; 13 males) healthy volunteers, 11 (19–55 years; 5 males) DoC 
patients, and 14 (18–40 years; 12 males) healthy volunteers participated in study 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Three 
volunteers (1 male) were excluded from data analyses of study 1, due to headphone malfunction or physiological 
impediments to reaching deep anesthesia in the scanner.
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Stimuli and Design. In study 1, a plot-driven audio story (5 minutes) was presented in the fMRI scanner 
to healthy volunteers and they were asked to simply listen with their eyes closed. A resting state scan (8 minutes) 
was also acquired, during which volunteers were asked to relax with their eyes closed and not fall asleep. A novel 
re-analysis of data from the scrambled story condition from Naci et al.30 (SI) was performed, as a baseline con-
dition with the intact audio story. In study 2, severely brain-injured patients were scanned as they listened to the 
same audio story as healthy volunteers, and also during the resting state. In study 3, 14/16 of volunteers from the 
anesthesia study completed a cognitive battery comprising 12 tasks based on classical cognitive psychology par-
adigms (www.CambridgeBrainSciences.com) (SI). The stimuli and design for each were reported in Hampshire 
et al.51.
Sedation procedure. fMRI data was acquired during the audio story and resting state conditions while par-
ticipants were awake (non-sedated) and deeply anesthetized with propofol (Ramsay score 5)77. Prior to acquiring 
fMRI data for the wakeful and deeply anesthetized states, 3 independent assessors (two anesthesiologists and one 
anesthesia nurse) evaluated each participant’s Ramsay level by communicating with them in person inside the 
fMRI scanner room, as follows. Awake Non-sedated. Volunteers were fully awake, alert and communicated appro-
priately. For the wakeful session, they were not scored on the Ramsay sedation scale, which is intended for patients 
in critical care settings or patients requiring sedation. During the wakeful audio story and resting state conditions, 
wakefulness was monitored with an infrared camera placed inside the scanner. Deep anesthesia. Intravenous 
propofol was administered with a Baxter AS 50 (Singapore). We used an effect-site/plasma steering algorithm in 
combination with the computer-controlled infusion pump to achieve step-wise increments in the sedative effect 
of propofol. The infusion pump was manually adjusted to achieve desired levels of sedation, guided by targeted 
concentrations of propofol, as predicted by the TIVA Trainer (the European Society for Intravenous Aneaesthesia, 
eurosiva.eu) pharmacokinetic simulation program. The pharmacokinetic model provided target-controlled infu-
sion by adjusting infusion rates of propofol over time to achieve and maintain the target blood concentrations as 
specified by the Marsh 378 compartment algorithm for each participant, as incorporated in the TIVA Trainer soft-
ware. Propofol infusion commenced with a target effect-site concentration of 0.6 µg/ml and oxygen was titrated 
to maintain SpO2 above 96%. If Ramsay level was lower than 5, the concentration was slowly increased by incre-
ments of 0.3 µg/ml with repeated assessments of responsiveness between increments to obtain a Ramsay score of 
5. Once participants stopped responding to verbal commands, were unable to engage in conversation, and were 
rousable only to physical stimulation they were considered to be at Ramsay level 5. The mean estimated effect-site 
propofol concentration was 2.48 (1.82–3.14) µg/ml, and the mean estimated plasma propofol concentration was 
2.68 (1.92–3.44) µg/ml. Mean total mass of propofol administered was 486.58 (373.30–599.86) mg. The variability 
of these concentrations and doses is typical for studies of the pharmacokinetics and pharmacodynamics of propo-
fol (SI). For both sessions, prior to the scanning, volunteers were asked to perform a basic verbal recall memory 
test and a computerized (4 minute) auditory target detection task (SI), which further assessed each individual’s 
wakefulness/deep anesthesia level independently of the anesthesia team. Scanning commenced only once the 
agreement among the 3 anesthesia assessors on the Ramsey level 5 was consistent with the lack of response in 
both verbal and computerized behavioral tests.
Scanning took place in a research not hospital setting, thus, breathing in the deeply anesthetized individuals 
could not be protected by intubation and was kept under spontaneous individual control. Therefore, although 
individuals were monitored closely by two anesthesiologists, airway security was at risk during scanning and 
time inside the scanner was kept at the minimum to ensure return to normal breathing. Thus, safety concerns 
for the deeply anesthetized individuals dictated that the novel condition of the naturalistic audio story be pre-
sented first. The baseline condition of the resting state was considered of secondary importance, as it has been 
reported previously in deep sedation condition of clinical studies. Therefore, this condition was acquired after 
the story condition across participants. However, the mean estimated effect-site propofol concentration and the 
mean estimated plasma propofol concentrations were kept stable by the pharmacokinetic model delivered via the 
TIVA Trainer infusion pump throughout the deep sedation session, and the lack of significant differences in the 
frame-wise movement parameters (assessed according to Power et al.)79 between the story and the resting state 
conditions further suggested no difference in the level of sedation between the two conditions. For similar safety 
reasons, data on the meaningless baseline (scrambled version of the audio story) that was designed to clarify 
processing mechanisms in wakeful individuals, was not collected in deeply anesthetized individuals. Throughout 
the deep sedation scanning session, the participant’s behavioral profile was monitored inside the scanner room by 
the anesthesia nurse and one of the anesthesiologists and outside from the scanner control room, with an infrared 
camera that displayed the participant’s face. No movement, fluctuations of sedation, or any other state change, was 
observed during the deep sedation scanning for any of the participants included in the study.
Patients. The severely brain-injured patients were selected based on their clinical diagnoses (i.e., VS/MCS/
LIS, at the time of fMRI data acquisition) to form a convenience sample of the disorders of consciousness (DoC) 
population. No previous fMRI data was available for any of the patients at the time of scanning. Prior to com-
mencing the scanning sessions, all VS/MCS patients were tested behaviorally at their bedside (outside of the 
scanner) with the Comma Recovery Scale-Revised (CRS-R)80. At the bedside behavioral testing, six patients met 
the recognized criteria for the vegetative state (VS), four for the minimally conscious state (MCS), and one for the 
locked-in syndrome (LIS) (full description of behavioral scores in Table S3). LIS describes an individual who, as 
a result of acute injury to the brain stem, has (almost) entirely lost the ability to produce motor actions, apart for 
small, but reproducible eye movements that confirm the presence of consciousness81. The patients’ demographic 
and clinical data are summarized in Tables S2, S3, and the structural, functional MRI assessment data in Figs 6 
and S1, S5, S6.
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Inside the scanner, each patient underwent a previously established fMRI-based protocol for assessing 
auditory perception and detecting covert awareness22,28 (Figs 6 and S5), in the same visit as the audio story 
scan to help establish the genuine status of consciousness. Prior to assessing command-following, we assessed 
auditory perception to ensure that it could not have been a limiting factor to producing willful brain responses. 
Patients had complex underlying medical states, including head flexion and overall muscle rigidity, tracheal 
tubes for assisted feeding and suctioning, etc., and the highly physically constraining scanning environment 
compromised their comfort. Some could not lie flat for long periods, others needed frequent suctioning, and 
other still became agitated after an initial brief period in the scanner. Therefore, to limit patient discomfort, 
time in the scanner was kept at a minimum and data on the meaningless baseline (scrambled version of the 
audio story) was not collected.
fMRI Acquisition and Analysis. Healthy individuals. Functional images were acquired on a 3 Tesla 
Siemens Tim Trio system, with a 32-channel head coil. Standard preprocessing procedures and data analyses 
were performed with SPM8 and the AA pipeline software82. In the processing pipeline, a temporal high-pass 
filter with a cut-off of 1/128 Hz was applied and movement was accounted for by regressing out the 6 motion 
parameters (x, y, z, roll, pitch, yaw). Additionally, frame-wise movement parameters according to Power et al.79  
were computed. Prior to analyses, the first five scans of each session were discarded to achieve T1 equi-
librium and to allow participants to adjust to the noise of the scanner. To avoid the formation of artificial 
anti-correlations, a confounding effect previously reported by Murphy and others83,84, we performed no global 
signal regression. Group-level correlational analyses explored, for each voxel, the inter-subject correlation in 
brain activity, by measuring the correlation of each subject’s time-course with the mean time-course of all other 
subjects. Significant clusters/voxels survived the p < 0.05 threshold, corrected for multiple comparisons with 
the family wise error (FWE). Functional connectivity (FC) was measured by computing via Pearson correlation 
the similarity of the fMRI time-courses of regions of interest (ROI)—based on well-established landmark ROIs 
from the resting state literature85 (Table S1)—within and between different networks86 (SI). As this measure 
of connectivity reflected the degree of similarity between the networks’ functional time-courses, an increase/
up-regulation of connectivity indicated more similar time-courses between networks, and thus a loss of func-
tional differentiation. Thus, ‘differentiation’ in this context is measured as the inverse of the Pearson correlation 
value and must not be confused with measures used in other approaches48. We note that Pearson correlation 
is a simple FC measure that, while advantageous for its minimal assumptions regarding the true nature of 
brain interactions and breath of its use in the neuroscientific literature, does not directly imply causal relations 
between neural regions. However, it is an adequate measure of FC for our purposes, because the time-course 
and spatial extent of the auditory and fronto-parietal networks encompassed a vast swath of the hierarchical 
processing cascade and, thus, many regions of cause-effect space were triggered by the stimulus. Their FC, as 
measured through Pearson correlation, reflected their interactions over the several minutes and the resulting 
computations on the information content of the auditory inputs. Future studies will also investigate the con-
nectivity between these regions by using direct measures of causal relationships87,88. T-tests used to explore 
effects of interest between functional connectivity and cognitive performance were Bonferroni corrected for 
multiple comparisons.
Severely brain-injured patients. Patient scanning was performed using the same 3 Tesla Siemens Tim Trio sys-
tem, 32-channel head coil, and data acquisition parameters as for the healthy participants. The same data preproc-
essing and analyses procedures as for healthy participants were applied to patient data. The patients’ spontaneous 
arousal during the audio story condition was monitored with an infrared camera placed inside the scanner. One 
patient (P7) fell asleep in the scanner for the entirely of the session and thus, showed no neuroimaging evidence 
of awareness despite an MCS diagnosis. The extent of information processing in individual patients (Fig. S6) was 
investigated with a novel technique developed by Naci and colleagues30,32. This approach did not involve normal-
ization to a healthy template, nor did it constrain the patient’s expected brain activity based on the localization of 
the effect in healthy controls. Instead, the time-course of brain activity in healthy controls served to build a strong 
prediction for the temporal evolution of brain activity in the patients. The precise location of a patient’s brain 
activity was expected to deviate from that of the healthy controls’. Not only is this naturally the case for individual 
healthy participants, but also, importantly, it is to be expected in brain-injured patients as a result of structural 
and concomitant functional re-organization of the brain. Nevertheless, a spatial heuristic based on the controls’ 
data informed the interpretation of the patients’ results, helping to infer the nature of the underlying residual 
brain function. In summary, drawing comparisons in the temporal domain enabled direct relation of the healthy 
controls’ activation to that of brain-injured patients, while avoiding stringent spatial constraints on the patients’ 
functional anatomy (Fig. S6). By contrast, for the analysis of functional connectivity based on a set of network 
nodes pre-defined in the healthy literature in the MNI standard neurological space, each patient’s brain was 
normalized to the healthy template. We reasoned that any damage within the regions of interest in each patient’s 
brain would add noise to the brain activity measurement and reduce the power to detect an effect. Therefore, 
any results in brain injured patients, that aligned with a-priory hypotheses based on the anesthesia study were 
highly unlikely given the heterogeneous structural preservation and would present a conservative estimate of the 
underlying effect.
Data Availability Statement
The datasets generated during and/or analysed during the current study are available from the corresponding 
author on reasonable request.
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